[Hat tip: A commenter at Samizdata]
That’s what these people are doing, far more effectively than Geert Wilders could ever manage.
Inayat Bunglawala, writing in the Guardian, claims that the British government’s refusal to give Yusuf Al-Qaradawi a visa, thus refusing permission to enter the country, violates Qaradawi’s freedom of speech:
Gordon Brown’s government has finally caved in to the noisy mob who have been angrily demanding that the elderly Islamic preacher, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, should be refused a visa to come to the UK for medical treatment.
Well, so much for free speech. You will recall that during the Satanic Verses and the Danish Cartoons row, British Muslims were repeatedly lectured to about the need to adapt to western notions of free speech. You may not like what is written or drawn, we were told, but as long as it does not break the law, you need to learn to put up with it.
The problem with this argument is that Mr Qaradawi’s freedom of speech has not in fact been curtailed. His words have not been banned from the media or the internet, he can continue giving interviews, making speeches, etc. It’s just he’s been refused permission to enter the country, which is no more of a violation of his freedom of speech than if I were to refuse him entry to my house.
The point is that freedom of speech is the right to express your views with your own resources, or resources you otherwise have permission to use, to anyone willing to listen. Freedom of speech does not give me the right to enter your house without your permission. Similarly it does not give a non-citizen the right to enter a country, whether he wishes to do so in order to spread his views or simply to have a holiday. The non-citizen must get permission from the country’s government to do so (said government exercising this power on behalf of the people of that country).
In practice permission is often granted by default, assuming you apply/arrive through legal channels. But governments have always had the power to refuse permission, a power which the are supposed to exercise in defence of the country concerned (e.g. to repel foreign invaders or anyone else who poses a risk to that country’s population). In this case, the British government has decided Al-Qaradawi poses some sort of threat. Whether they are right in that decision is a separate matter from any alleged violation of freedom of speech.
Mr. Bunglawala is confusing freedom of speech with the right to be provided with a platform of one’s choice in a location of one’s choice. No one has that right.
Apostasy means the abandonment of a belief or principle. In a religious context, it generally means abandoning one’s faith.
Today, The Times carries a report about a British woman who converted to Christianity, from Islam, who is receiving police protection because of death threats received from members of her family. She is reported as saying:
“I know the Koran says that anyone who goes away from Islam should be killed as an apostate so in some ways my family are following the Koran. They are following Islam to the word. But I do not think every Muslim would actually act on that,” she said.
“…apostasy and treason were near identical terms in seventh-century Arabia. However the relationship betwen the two has endured in Islam, so that even today there are some Muslims who continue to make the unsubstantiated and un-Quranic assertion that the two sins — apostasy and treason —deserve the same punishment: death.” (page 119, emphasis added)
There is a quotation from the Koran itself, often used to bolster this message, from Sura 2,256 which, in three different translations, seems unequivocal that there should be no compulsion in religion:
“YUSUFALI: Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things.
PICKTHAL: There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error. And he who rejecteth false deities and believeth in Allah hath grasped a firm handhold which will never break. Allah is Hearer, Knower.
SHAKIR: There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has become clearly distinct from error; therefore, whoever disbelieves in the Shaitan and believes in Allah he indeed has laid hold on the firmest handle, which shall not break off, and Allah is Hearing, Knowing.”
In my own copy of an edition of Rodwell’s translation of the Koran, this verse reads:
“Let there be no compulsion in religion. Now is the right way distinct from error. Whoever shall deny Thagout and believe in God – he will have taken hold of a strong handle that shall not be broken: and God is He who Heareth, Knoweth.” (page 27)
So four different translations give much the same message, suggesting the Koran does indeed suggest that “there shall be no compulsion in religion”. But this does not prove that the Koran does not prescribe death as a punishment for apostasy, it merely proves that one of its many verses would contradict any such prescription.
“YUSUFALI: They but wish that ye should reject Faith, as they do, and thus be on the same footing (as they): But take not friends from their ranks until they flee in the way of Allah (From what is forbidden). But if they turn renegades, seize them and slay them wherever ye find them; and (in any case) take no friends or helpers from their ranks;-
PICKTHAL: They long that ye should disbelieve even as they disbelieve, that ye may be upon a level (with them). So choose not friends from them till they forsake their homes in the way of Allah; if they turn back (to enmity) then take them and kill them wherever ye find them, and choose no friend nor helper from among them,
SHAKIR: They desire that you should disbelieve as they have disbelieved, so that you might be (all) alike; therefore take not from among them friends until they fly (their homes) in Allah’s way; but if they turn back, then seize them and kill them wherever you find them, and take not from among them a friend or a helper.” (emphasis added)
And from my copy of Rodwell, page 58 (as Sura 4,91, presumably due to differences in the translations):
“They desire that you should be infidels as they are infidels, and that ye should be alike. Take therefore none of them for friends, till they have fled their homes for the cause of God. If they turn back, then seize them, and slay them wherever ye find them; but take none of them as friends or helpers.” (emphasis added)
Here it seems to me that one can interpret these passages to mean that apostates should be killed, and some of the four translations above suggest that more strongly than others. However one of the translations hints that “turning back” involves enmity from the apostates (as opposed to mere disbelief), suggesting that it may be possible to interpret this passage somewhat differently.
Nevertheless there seems to be scope for somone applying a literal interpretation of the Koran to conclude, from Sura 4,89, that apostates should be killed, despite Sura 2,256.
However, I suspect the belief that apostates should be killed most likely stems from the Hadith (the traditional writings about the life of Mohammed and what he said that Muslims draw on in addition to the Koran), rather than the Koran per se. The Hadith have quotations from Mohammed that clearly state that the punishment for apostasy is death, (such as this one and this one). The Koran is ambiguous (albeit clear that Allah has a dim view of apostates), but the Hadith are not.
In my previous post, I argued that Steve Edwards’ argument (that being a non-Muslim entailed holding certain beliefs the expression of which a proposed law against “gratuitous insults” against a religion would necessarily proscribe) falls down because it relied on believing that Muhammad was evil when this was not entailed by disbelieving that Muhammad received instruction and revelation directly from God and not entailed by believing Muhammad lied when he claimed to have received such word from God.
However, it seems to me that a version of the argument can be constructed that does hold water.
I, as an atheistically/agnostically inclined non-Muslim, hold the belief that Muhammad did not receive instruction/revelation from God. Logically speaking, I thereby believe that, unless he’s been misrepresented, Muhammad was a false prophet who was, at best, mistaken.
To someone who believes that Muhammad was God’s Prophet on earth and that his revelations are the unerring word of God, my belief is blasphemous and an insult to their religion. Ergo a law against blasphemy directed at Islam (or at religion in general) would proscribe my expression of this view.
However one could argue that the proposed law was actually against gratuitous insults against a religion and thus my ability to express my beliefs was not threatened. For example, if I state that belief as part of a defence of my position of being a non-Muslim, surely that is not gratuitous, because my purpose is to explain/defend myself, not to insult Muslims?
One problem here is who is to judge whether my statement is a “gratuitous” insult or not? If a law against gratuitous insults is in place, then my mere expression of a belief that a particular Muslim regards as insulting to his religion would be grounds for suspicion that I may have committed the offence. I.e. the police might arrest me, even if they later drop charges or I’m able to persuade the court it wasn’t gratuitous. The point is that the existence of such a law will deter expression of any views that some vocal Muslims find insulting, because of the risk of arrest and prosecution.
Whether you’ve broken the law or not depends on whether the court decides you’ve been gratuitous or not. The police may therefore decide that it is better to arrest you (and thereby appease an angry mob?) and let the court decide (so the police can say to the mob it wasn’t their decision?), lest they let you get away with an insult that would have been found to be gratuitous by the court.
Also, surely, we should be allowed to express our sincerely held views without them needing to pass a test of “gratuitousness”?
The only restriction on this right is that I do so using only those resources I have legitimate access to (e.g. my blog or a newspaper where the editor has agreed to publish) and only to people willing to listen (anyone who reads my blog or the newspaper, all of whom have a choice not to read either the blog or the newspaper and to ignore the article concerned even if they read other things).
I do not have a right to harass/intrude upon Muslims (or anyone else) going about their daily lives by e.g. walking up to them in the street and telling them what I think, or worse, bursting into their mosques or homes to do the same.
But I do, and should, have the right to express such a view in privacy to friends, in debates about the issue where I’m invited to speak, or in any medium where readers can choose whether they read/listen and what they read/listen to and where the owners of the medium give me permission.
Otherwise, we allow people to silence those they do not like via giving them a veto over what people are allowed to say. All they need to do to exercise the veto is raise hell and act “outraged” at the offence/insult they claim is caused to them. Such an approach is unlikely to be beneficial to social harmony, unless people give up on the idea of being able to freely express sincerely held views!
Samizdata recently quoted an interesting article by Steve Edwards. At the time I first read the article, I thought it a cogent argument (as indicated in my comment at Samizdata), but now I’m not so sure.
Edwards attempts to demonstrate that being a non-Muslim logically entails holding beliefs that Muslims will find blasphemous on the ground that they entail holding less than flattering views of the Prophet Muhammad. As such, any laws against “gratuitously insulting” Muhammad will have the logical effect of proscribing any attempt by a non-Muslim to explain and defend their position, and should thus be rejected on freedom of speech grounds.
I reproduce the core of Edwards’ argument below, interspersed with my own comments:
Commenting on the most ‘offensive’ of the cartoons, Shearmur suggests that such a ‘gratuitous insult to the Prophet’ Mohammad could be grounds for legal sanctions.[…] As mentioned before, he also proffers that ‘polite contestation of religious claims’ should be protected speech. What then, shall we make of any polite contestation of a religious claim that, by necessity, leads the interlocutor to make a seemingly ‘gratuitous insult to the (alleged) Prophet’?
A Muslim is somebody who believes that a man called Mohammad (who lived around the turn of the 6th-7th Century AD) was the last in a long line of prophets in the Near East, and who passed on certain revelations and instructions directly from God Himself. By logic, a non-Muslim is somebody who does not accept that Mohammad was any such prophet, and thereby rejects his teachings as not having come from God. (emphasis in original)
The first logical error arises here. Take Edwards’ definition of a Muslim. He effectively defines a Muslim as someone who believes all of the following propositions:
Logically speaking, on the above definition of a Muslim, a non-Muslim is anyone who regards at least one of the propositions above to be false, but Edwards defines a non-Muslim simply as someone who regards proposition 5 (and there by 3 and 4) to be false. Yet logically the non-Muslim may simply believe Muhammad was actually called Fred or that she(!) lived in the 18th century, or that he was not the last in a long line of prophets (e.g. he could be the only prophet or someone else was a prophet after him).
However arguably the above beliefs would all be regarded as blasphemous by devout Muslims, so perhaps this logical error does not undermine the more general claim that a non-Muslim must of logical necessity hold beliefs that a Muslim will find blasphemous.
Let us reflect further on the epistemology of a non-Muslim—if, contrary to Mohammad’s claims (assuming he has been represented correctly), we do not believe that he was any such prophet from God, what do we truly think of the man?
The answer must be one of three possibilities: either Mohammad was a liar, or he was deluded (that is to say, he was deeply mistaken), or he was mad.[…] These are the only possible conclusions of the intellectually honest non-Muslim. (emphasis in original)
Actually I disagree. The logical implication of not believing that Muhammad did receive instructions and revelations directly from God, is simply that Muhammad either lied or was mistaken. Whether the mistake was down to “madness” or “delusion” or some other issue (failure to comprehend what his body/mind were doing?) is something one need not commit to. So the question is then whether believing Muhammad was mistaken is blasphemous and liable to violate the proposed law against such blasphemy. I’ll take it as read that viewing Muhammad as a liar will be blasphemous.
Let us ponder one of the three possibilities—that Mohammad was a liar. Would it be unreasonable then to posit that a man willing to deceive many thousands of people, perhaps out of hunger for power or self-aggrandisement, could be labelled as ‘evil’?
This is a bit of a straw-man. Believing that Muhammad was lying about the matter does not logically entail that he did so out of hunger for power or self aggrandisement. He may have genuinely believed that the religion he was founding would help mould a better society and was willing to lie in that cause. It could even be argued that the development of an Islamic empire, with some significant achievements to its credit, suggests that Islam did provide an advance on the Arab society that went before it, and thus Muhammad did bequeath a better society to Arabs (admittedly at the expense of a lot of battles and conquests).
If so, on what basis do we object to an extremely negative portrayal (either graphic or prose) of such an ‘evildoer’? Whether or not such a portrayal may appear ‘gratuitous’ or provoke widespread anger, it would nonetheless be a justifiable expression of dissent. Therefore, to place legal sanctions on any such piece of literature is to necessarily outlaw opposition to, and disagreement with, Islam to a logical denouement; this suggests we are implicitly calling for the abolition of the right to proclaim oneself a non-Muslim in clear and in certain terms. That is, one may still be a nominal ‘non-Muslim’ free of harassment, but one cannot explain and defend one’s position in any significant detail without committing the now-proscribed act of blasphemy.
As indicated above, I believe the argument fell down by this point. Believing Muhammad did not receive revelations and instructions from God does not entail believing he was a liar and believing he was a liar does not entail believing he was evil. Yet Edwards’ argument seems to be based on these straw men.
However, I think the conclusion has legs and can be supported in a different manner. I shall explain why in my next post.